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't RESTRC wE WVtR vo for immigration to Israel. The numbers grew whole communities have migrated to Israel from dramatically in the latter months of 1990, and it numerous countries around the world. Each appears that this trend will continue at least in the immigrant group has had its own characteristics near term. Although estimates vary, it seems likely defined by reasons for leaving the place of origin, at least 500,000 Soviet Jews will have arrived in decisions to immigrate to Israel, size, political and
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Israel over the few years since 1990. Some, socio-economic background, and impact on the including prominent Jewish leaders and major Israeli system, among other factors. 3 Jewish organizations in Israel and the United States, The current wave of Jewish immigration from the have suggested the number may reach one million Soviet Union to Israel is, in virtually all respects, by 1995. different from its predecessors. The primary purpose
The new Soviet immigration to Israel is not only of this study is to address the impact of the ongoing larger than that of recent years, it is also qualitatively wave of Soviet Jewish immigration on Israel's different in a number of ways, including such factors political system and policies. Union relations, and the impact of the immigration became an important factor in a number of spheres. on the Arab-Israeli conflict. 5 In addition to these including United States-Soviet relations,
I
Soviet-Arab. and Soviet-Israeli relations. It has also
Israel and the world Jewish community over had an effect on the Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as decades. There has never been, there is not now, and United States-Israeli relations and internal Israeli there likely never will be, a question of not allowing political, economic, and social developments. While all who wish to immigrate to Israel to do so. That many of these themes relating to Soviet Jews have was, and remains, the central rationale for the been the focus of international attention, and some creation and continuation of an independent Jewish have been carefully examined, one sector which state. Thus, no matter the financial or other costs, remains of lesser attention has been that of the Israel will seek to accept and absorb the flow of current and future political roles of these new immigrants. Simcha Dinitz, the chairman of the immigrants to Israel in the Israeli political system.
Jewish Agency which has significant responsibility for immigrant absorption, has summarized this The Exodus of Soviet Jews perspective as follows: "We are going to get them The emigration ofJews from the Soviet Union and out as quickly as we can, regardless of the their immigration to Israel has been the subject of difficulties it creates here. Because if we wait, the substantial concern over several decades. The doors could close and it could be too late." The relatively slow pace of Soviet Jewish amendment which linked United States trade immigration to Israel that was the case before 1990 policies with the treatment of Soviet Jews. In the and even in the early months of that year changed Reagan administration, Secretary of State George dramatically by year's end. By late December 1990, Shultz focused on the plight of Soviet Jews as a the Jewish Agency was predicting arrival in Israel matter of personal and official concern during his of between 1200 and 1500 immigrants daily, visits to Moscow and in other dealings with the compared to recent years, when this number would Soviet Union, as did President Reagan at various take weeks or months to achieve. By mid-December summit meetings and in other diplomatic-political 1990, more than 1000 immigrants were arriving exchanges with Gorbachev.
daily. On 23 December 1990, the Jerusalem Post Until recently, the focus was on the treatment of reported: "Record 7,000 Soviet immigrants are Jews within the Soviet Union and on securing for flown in over the weekend, as efforts intensified to them the right to emigrate and travel to Israel or the rush Soviet Jews to Israel from a country rapidly United States. Increasingly, under Mikhail descending into chaos." 9 Gorbachev, the issue changed as emigration became Although Soviet in origin, those immigrants came more possible and encompassed the location of primarily from East European transit points such as potential immigrants. Also at issue was whether they Warsaw and Budapest. The Jewish Agency sought would eventually reach the United States or Israel.
to expedite the flow, given the growing tensions and There was a "tug of war" between and among Jewish problems in the USSR, and special permission was and non-Jewish organizations and forces primarily granted even for planes to land on Shabbat (the in the United States and Israel over the eventual Sabbath). At the same time, El Al and other airlines destination of the Jews who were able to secure added additional flights to expedite the flow. release from the Soviet Union.
Summarizing the immigration, the Jerusalem Post Decisions made under Gorbachev allowing Jewish stated, "this exodus (is) unprecedented in its emigration in growing numbers shifted the nature of dimensions in Jewish history." the problem. It moved from one of securing rights
As the pace of immigration increased, so did the in the Soviet Union (including the right to emigrate), need to provide essential logistical measures. The to where they would go and the problems of dealing first issue was how to get the Soviet Jews from the with emigration at its point of arrival. This Soviet Union to Israel. The process required, among increasingly posed different issues, many political, other elements, special El A] flights to pick up Jews It is perhaps crucial to reiterate the obvious. The stranded in various European capitals, permission exodus of Jews from the Soviet Union (and its for otherwise not-permitted flights on the Sabbath former Eastern European bloc) has been a goal of to land in Israel, and various other special arrangements. The clear and obvious basic needs of stopped or the infrastructure might make it housing and transition assistance for the immigrants impossible). Developments in December 1990 were addressed upon their arrival.
(such as Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's The sudden growth in immigration taxed Israel's resignation) seemed simply to "confirm" existing resources and facilities, and a coordinated national suspicions and concerns. The conclusion of many effort was deemed essential.
11 Costs of the massive Israelis as well as Soviet Jews was relatively straight immigration can be measured partly in fiscal terms forward and summed up by a Jerusalem Post and partly in required services and support.
editorial comment: "Clearly, the extrication of Jews Although precise information is difficult to identify, from the Soviet Union must be effected and costs and needs will vary considerably across immediately." 14 the group, clearly the financial requirements for absorption are substantially higher than anyone had Who Are They? Basic Characteristics predicted in the past few years. Billions of dollars
The Soviet immigrants of 1990-1991 are in various will be required to meet the needs of the new respects different from many of their predecessors immigrant waves (overwhelmingly Soviet in origin, who arrived in Israel over the previous four decades. but also including the emergency airlifts of the differing even from other recent arrivals from the Falashas from Ethiopia).
12 A second concern is Soviet Union. Also, they differ from the Ethiopian adequate and sufficient housing. The sudden influx immigrants who arrived by special arrangement in has created housing shortages as well as an increase emergency airlifts in 1991. in housing costs. A third area is jobs. Israel's unemployment rate was more than nine percent in Background. By all measures, most of the new problematic, and it is difficult to be absolutely immigrants are well educated, with estimates precise because of the continuous flow, the data for running as high as 75 percent of the group 1990 seem to describe the migrants during that year possessing a university or equivalent education. and reflect accurately the continued flow in 1991.
Many were professionals in the USSR. Large Soviet immigration brings with it a been "forced" to flee the Soviet Union for Israel not multiplicity of problems which tend to grow necessarily by choice, but to ensure their survival. It geometrically with the growth of the immigration is not "Jewish" or "Zionist" in the traditional and group. Clearly, the success or failure of the usual sense of those terms. They are, instead, authorities in dealing with problems facing the searching for peace, security, and a decent future.
immigrants, such as language, housing, and jobs, They wish to leave a country characterized by will have political ramifications. Successful anti-Semitism, general insecurity, and economic integration will likely be rewarded with votes; and social deprivation, failure may lead to votes for the party out of power. Nevertheless, there seems to be little question The need to become functioning members of the about the desire of the Soviet Jews to come and live new system is the first concern of immigrants. This in Israel. The October 1990 PORI study indicates will take time, especially given the current situation that most Soviet Jews left the USSR because of and the needs of immigration. The year 1992 may insecurity and anti-semitism. Furthermore, 84 be "too soon" for many to reach a point of political percent listed Israel as their first choice of plac.c of "ripeness" or readiness to play a significant role in residence even when given any nation as an option.
Israeli politics. Nearly 90 percent responded they were very likely to remain in Israel for at least the next few years. At
Concerns of the New Immigrants least in the short term. this is likely to be the case, As might be expected, the new immigrants were although partly because of a lack of available faced with the issues faced by many new immigrants alternative points of destination, rather than in many locations. thus they will tilt to the right; and (2) newcomers represent a highly educated and cultured group of Other reasons which may explain support of Likud voters, similar to the Israeli voters who tend to tilt to include the fact that newcomers tend to be patriotic the left. There is intensive activity within the small and have a basic dislike of the Arabs. 21 In addition, right wing parties (Tehiya, Tzomet, and Moledet), Likud, which in the past often said there could be a who believe that their right wing ideology will be large immigration of Jews to Israel, could now claim readily accepted by the immigrants, whose main it was the party which knew the olim would come, priority is to assure the safety and security of their expected their arrival and, as such, is deserving of new haven. 17 their support. 22 Furthermore, Likud believes that Within the small left-wing parties, there is no since the actual absorption process often takes place unified level of activity. While Mapam could be in development towns which are, generally considered the most active party througnout the speaking, Likud strongholds, part of the absorption political spectrum, 18 Shinui shows almost no process will include an adoption of right wing activity at all. Very intensive activity, characterized political attitudes similar to ones surrounding them by strongly religious orientation, has been central to in their immediate environment. 23 Likd also relies the religious parties such as Mafdal, Agudat Yisrael, on the influence iunigrant children will have in Degel Hatora, and Shas. 19 Their efforts include the shaping their parent's political beliefs. Children establishment of ulpanim for the study of Judaism generally are absorbed more quickly into Israeli life and the Hebrew language, financial help to needy and newcomer children show right wing political families, hospitality during Jewish holidays, and tendencies.
24 youth group activity. Most active among the Likud sees its hard line positions on questions of religious parties is Shas, which uses its control over peace and security as an additional factor which will the Ministry of Absorption to help assure political make the party appealing to the olim. Thus, Kleiner gain.
argues, "the decisive factor will be the fact that The major parties, Likud and Labor, potentially Russia is a large state. For people who are have the most to gain, or to lose, in the effort to accustomed to such size it will be difficult to see how a state which is only 14 kilometers wide [could continue to exist].... They have a basic places in the country (including Judea and Samaria, understanding [of this] because geo-olitical i.e., the West Bank), and lectures and seminars, he arguments were often used in the USSR. " said in 1991 that the party "was trying to do some The 1991 Gulf War during which Israeli cities in things, but clearly not enough." He has admitted the the center of the country were struck by missiles development of an argument within the party on this seems to only strengthen this argument. Likud's question. 3 and expressed his hope that as the elections believe that the newcomers who were here during approach this activity will increase. the war will turn to the right. 26 As opposed to Likud, Labor seems to believe that factors relating to social and cultural background, Likud believes its status as largest right wing party reinforced by "rational" political thinking and will make it more attractive to the olim than smaller Likud's ineffective absorption policies, will lead the parties which hold similar positions on questions of olim to vote in its favor. 27 for Likud and to the right, for all sorts of reasons.
Especially cultural reasons ... because people of Despite these factors which seem to assure Likud's culture are not to be found on that side." 3 3 capability to gain immigrant support, the party Labor considers immigrants to be "pragmatic and realizes its capability to successfully absorb the sane" voters. 34 As such, they will not support what newcomers will have a direct influence on its ability Labor considers to be Likud's "adventurist" to gain votes. As Kleiner admitted, "Likud will be positions on questions of peace and security. 35 As judged on its capability to absorb this aliya." 2 Further left on the political spectrum, parties such interpreted by Labor as leading to its gain.
as Shinui and Mapam greatly differ both in terms of Similar to Likud, Labor did not pursue intensive ideology and in terms of their levels of activity activity among the newcomers during 1990. Unlike among the newcomers. While both are indeed Likud, however, the party's officials tend to explain associated with the political left, particularly on this inactivity by using ideological reasons.
issues of peace and security, they greatly differ in According to Labor's Shimon Alon, political their views on economic issues. activity among the newcomers, such as that Shinui, as a party arguing for a free market undertaken by Likud "should be considered a economy, believes it could win the Soviet vote since crime," since the important issue at the moment the olim tend to be opposed to a socialist economy. stand on citizen rights. Their atheist background will also make them likely to adopt the party's position As Alon's comments demonstrate, Labor's in questions relating to freedom of religion and activity among the Russian immigrants is meant to worship. communicate, at least to some extent, a political Despite Shinui's belief in its capability to gain at message, despite its suggestion that it is a least some of the olim's support, it engages in little disinterested party.
political activity among them. The party's activities Generally speaking, however, the feeling in Labor up to June 1991 included publication of limited in the summer of 1990 was that it was still too early amounts of Russian-language materials and a major to discuss the political tendencies of the immigrants.
seminar attended by newcomers from various In the summer of 1990. Labor thus was still an locations throughout the country. Several additional inactive party, attempting to overcome difficulties seminars were planned to take place later in the year. resulting from its own socialist essence.
The goal of such meetings was to create a certain basis for support among the newcomer, through immigrants, as people who lived in a very large which the party could reach an increasing number country, will be more willing to accept the fact that of people. Such activity, however, remains limited a small piece of land which will be given to the in scope, mostly due to lack of funds.
Palestinians for the establishment of an independent Similar to Shinui, Mapam views economic issues state is meaningless to Israel's security, particularly as central to future immigrant voting patterns. In in an age in which "missiles which can cross borders contrast to the popular opinion that the olim will be and land on Tel Aviv from Iraq."" somewhat reluctant to vote for a party which In an interview on 28 August 1990, Alex Glasman Science Minister, most of her activity focuses on of Likud said, "One has to remember where they absorption issues. Among such activities is the come from. Many are still wary of full political establishment of a new institution which trains identification." Additionally, due to their recent people who directly absorb the olim. Tehiya's other arrival in Israel, many are not yet fully aware of the MK, Yuval Neeman, is also directly involved in the structure of Israeli politics, the exact nature and process and at one point threatened to leave the programs of the various parties, or the main issues government unless a budget for the absorption of of political debate. 53 The majority of olim are more 2,000 Soviet scientists is approved, concerned with immediate personal problems, such On the level of the movement, the party has as employment and housing, than with Israeli established ulpanim in several of its branches across political questions. 54 This is well reflected by the the country, and holds seminars, visits to Judea and fact that in a poll taken in October 1990, 66 percent Samaria, and lectures for the newcomers. 48 This of all people polled did not express a party activity, according to Dayan, is clearly political and preference.
5
! not philanthropic in nature. The party also published This is not to say, however, that the olim lack several Russian language pamphlets and has beeni interest or do not wish to participate in the next planning publication of a Russian-language Israeli elections. According to a poll conducted by newspaper. 9 PORI in October 1990 in which 401 people were Moledet believes 75 percent of the voters will tilt polled, 42.9 percent of the newcomers are very to the right. 5° The party believes it will win the likely and 27.9 percent are somewhat likely to vote support of newcomers because they would like to in the next Israeli elections. 56 This is about 10 live in a secure and safe place, a result which percent less that the general turnout of Israeli Moledet believes its program offers. citizens in national elections. Similar to Tehiya, Moledet's General Secretary Subsequent data suggest the participation rate will Beni Ben-Tzur believes that the fact the immigrants increase to the usual Israeli level by the projected come from a vast country will make them resist 1992 election. It is interesting to note that while territorial compromises because they understand immigrants seem noncommittal on questions "that territory is important and one shouldn't give it relating to party identification and leadership, they up." 51 have a clear right wing orientation when it comes to The party's activity appears to be more sporadic policy questions relating to peace and security. In an and less organized than that of the others. Such
October 1990 poll, the majority of the immigrants activity includes a special Russian-speaking advisor (55 percent) said that Israel should retain all the West Bank and Gaza "even if it means final peace conflict, but rather will begin to center on the agreement may not be reached." In the same poll, 85 parties' economic and social platforms. 65 The result percent said population transfer of all Arabs from will be electitn campaigns more similar to those in Israel and the territories which will make Israel a the United States and Europe Stem argues that this purely Jewish state was desirable, although 61 will normalize what until now had been an abnormal percent found it impossible.
57 Similar opinions were political system. expressed in the June 1991 Reshet Yediot Tikshoret
Another interesting possibility is reflected in poll, where 45 percent were either for enforcement growing thoughts about unification among the of Israeli law or population transfer as a preferred smaller parties on both the left and the right of the solution to the Arab-Israeli problem."I political spectrum. This perceived need to consider Nevertheless, only 58.8 percent among the people unification results from the fact that as more who would like to keep the territories were also immigrants arrive, and the Israeli population grows, willing to go to war over them. 59 Thus, one can talk a Knesset mandate will require more votes. For each about a developing political awareness among the of the smaller parties, this means that in order to newcomers, but not one which is fully developed, maintain a power base, they will need to appeal to a The role newcomers will play in the 1992 Knesset larger number of voters. 
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Israeli political life, tend to disagree as to the essence of this change. 60 While some, and especially the On the political left, there have been signs of larger parties, expected the political map to more unification since the summer of 1990. There is an decisively tilt in one direction or the other, 61 other actual, although informal, unification of three of the parties, especially Shinui, expected it to change into left of center parties: Ratz (five mandates), Mapam a more centripetal, center-seeking system.
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(three mandates) and Shinui (two mandates). The Moreover, while most parties agreed that the change talk of unification began at a meeting of all ten MKs will be political, others, and particularly Shimon held in the Knesset in which they decided to act as Alon of Labor, expected it to be a cultural-social a unified parliamentary bloc in order to set the stage change. 63 for full unification. They also agreed that t.e unified An altogether different opinion was expressed by list would be led by Shulamit Aloni of Ratz. 67 While Dr. Yuri Stem, a Soviet-Jewish activist who was there are no major differences among these parties among the founders of the "Information Center for on peace related issues, the biggest obstacles to Soviet Jewry" and the "Zionist Forum." Stem unification are in their difference on economic believes the change immigration will introduce into issues. 68 Only when each of the parties meets to Israeli political life will be a "normalization" of discuss and ratify the proposed unification 69 will the Israeli politics by focusing it on internal rather than full strength of the resistance to such a move become external questions.6 4 This will result from the fact known. While there is no clear evidence that the that immigrants, as a group seeking employment creation of the leftist political bloc (referred to as the and housing, will naturally focus on economic and "peace bloc") is a direct result of the Soviet social questions, unlike most Israeli voters, who immigration, the impact of the immigrant vote according to Stem, are mostly concerned with clearly was a factor taken into account when the foreign policy issues. Thus, the divide between the decision was made to attempt such a unification. Israeli political left and right will not center on Signs of unification are less evident on the political questions relating mostly to the Arab-Israeli right. Because the political right, according to most polls and political figures, will benefit most from the about the possibility of the organization of an Soviet Jewish immigration, the right wing parties independent immigrant party (during the summer of seem confident in their capability to maintain their 1991), most Israeli party representatives said several previous level of support, and perhaps even to such organizations already existed, and that they increase it. 70 that will take part in the elections.
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A Russian Political Party? Similar views were expressed by both Shinui and One of the more interesting questions is whether Mapam, on the left end of the political spectrum. Soviet immigrants will establish their own political Dov Hefetz of Shinui said that the organization of party. While during the summer of 1990 it was still such political bodies was "certainly possible" and somewhat unclear whether there would be an admitted he knew of several such attempts.
77
independent Russian list in the next Knesset Mapam's Victor Blit said the olim are "certainly election, as time progresses, such a possibility is considering" the establishment of such parties and gradually turning into a reality. Bamakom, 79 mentions the "Zionist Forum," claims 68 percent of the olim will support a Soviet Sharansky's organization, which is the largest and party. 73 This claim is strengthened by the fact that most active body among the Russian immigrants;& 8 in the same poll, 60 percent of the 575 people polled the "association of Soviet immigrants " 81 headed by said they will not vote for any Israeli ,any among Robert Golan, which is identified with Labor; Am the 11 mentioned in the questionnaire.
Ehad; and finally a new organization, headed by These results evidently did not escape the attention Yosef Horol, which is known to be affiliated with of most of Israel's political parties. When asked Likud.
82
The success of a new political Russian immigrants Sharansky is unwilling to commit himself fully to list will depend to a large extent on the personalities the political race. Refusing to be identified with leading it. According to most polls, the most popular either side of the political spectrum, he denies man among newcomers is Nathan Sharansky. A rumors he will head an independent olim party in the PORI poll conducted in October 1990 suggests near future. The parties, although continuously almost45percentoftheSovietvotersfindhimeither attempting to gain his support, gradually are very or somewhat favorable.
83 A later poll, understanding that he would like to maintain his conducted in July 1991, claims over 60 percent of image as a national hero, and thus may choose to all immigrants supporting the establishment of an avoid politics altogether. When asked to comment, independent Russian olim party support Sharansky Tehiya's Dani Dayan said: "At the moment it seems as the most popular personality. 84 that Sharansky himself does not intend to run. That This is not to say, however, that thee is no doesn't mean that them couldn't be people close to opposition to Sharansky among the immigrants.
Sharanski who ... enjoy his backing, and they could Heading this opposition is a bodK called be the ones leading the list. clear in what political direction they could tilt. rights but rather that he jumped on the Zionist cause Nevertheless, there seem to be active attempts from only when he understood it could get him out of both Likud and Labor to have such parties affiliated jail." interesting perspective is that despite all the factors, have persisted, denials have been viewed with in the final analysis, the left will gain some support skepticism, and other (non-Soviet) political figures as the party "out of power" and will therefore able and observers seem to view the idea as a relative to capitalize on failures of Likud. On the other hand, certainty. Such a party could develop in a number of there will be the "natural" tendency of the former ways, but the two basic alternatives seem to be a communist subjects to turn away from socialism to party with Sharansky as the central figure or one the right, and their tendency in this direction will be without him. Although he seems to be the influenced by the fact that they have been gotten out centerpiece of highly visible Soviet Jewish activities of the Soviet Union and to Israel by Likud. But, and a focus of media attention, he is increasingly when all is said and done, it may well be that voters viewed in and out of the Soviet Jewish community will divide along the entire political spectrum with and other political circles as something of an a small advantage to the right of center (even if not opportunist. Some Soviet Jews see him as a all to Likud). "professional" Soviet Jew, using his celebrity status to attract attention, earn substantial sums of money,
Elections 1992: The Effect of Soviet Immigrants and spend large blocks of time outside of Israel.
In the final analysis, the effect of Soviet Jews will Many politicians, especially on the right of center be apparent in the 1992 Knesset election. Tables 5 (particularly in Likud), find his disclaimers of and 6 suggest alternative results. political ambition not particularly credible and see
Following that are five scenarios estimating the a Soviet-oriented political party as a distinct impact of the new immigrants on the 1992 elections. possibility in the 1992 election.
Scenario One is a Labor-favorable outcome, which Would such a party prove successful and develop seems improbable. Scenario Two takes into staying power? Although it is premature to consideration the formation of an "immigrant determine the longevity of a nonexistent party, the party." The third foresees reinforcement of the overriding consensus is that should such a party status quo and distribution of Soviet Jewish votes emerge, it will most likely follow the same general parallel to the 1988 distribution. The fourth is based path of and suffer the same fate of early ethnic on a late 1990 PORI poll which gives the impression parties of the 1950s (the Yemenite Party).
that the new immigrants will vote in the percentages indicated. Scenario Five is based on the estimates of Right, Left, or Center?
voting patterns suggested by party officials and A central question is whether the right (primarily, senior political figures. It appears to be the most but not exclusively, Likud), the left (essentially probable based on available evidence to date. Labor), or others will benefit from the voting The views contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as
Icessarlily representing the official policy, either expressed or implied, of the Defense Intelligence ollege, the Department of Defense, or the US Government. Prepared by National UJA. Data from the Jewish Agency for Israel. ' enter Israel under the Law of Return can be estimated as follows: 3 Much of this has been studied and documented for the waves those who identified themselves as Jews in the 1988 population of immigrants prior to the current group of Soviet Jews.
census of the Soviet Union (1,370,000 to 1.400,000 people); Jews 4n some respects, this is akin to trying to hit a moving target, not identifying themselves as such, and the offspring of given the rapid pace of recent developments. Nevertheless. some intermarriages, where one grandparent is Jewish (1,500,000 to patterns and trends are clear, and they form the base for tiis 2,000,000 people); their non-Jewish relatives (500,000 to analysis. 600,000 people). The total number thus comes to about 3.5 Sin general, the Arab states have oprosed Soviet policy million. Assuming that half of these people are preparing to allowing Jews to emigrate to Israel. arguing in part that they emigrate, we arrive at 1.75 million potential immigrants. To this would displace Palestinian Arabs in the occupied tenitories. A number one should add 20 percent of non-Jews who will obtain short summary of the Arab view is contained in *Soviet Jewish forged documents to prove their ostensible Jewishness. This gives Immigration." Palestine Perspectives (September-October us an estimate of 2 million potential immigrants, and this is a 1990): 6-7. The core of the position is articulated as follows:
conservative happen. I'm not sure it will happen in the coming elections. " Gordon interview, 31 August 1990.
although that is also a possibility... At any rate. I believe that after 37Gordon interview, 31 August 1990.
these elections there will not be a situation, like today, when there
